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<title>John Viega on O&apos;Reilly Broadcast</title>
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<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2008-08-07://53</id>
<updated>2009-02-16T15:00:00Z</updated>

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<entry>
<title>Unhappy Valentine&apos;s Day</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2009/02/unhappy-valentines-day.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2009://53.35329</id>

<published>2009-02-16T15:00:00Z</published>
<updated>2009-02-16T15:00:00Z</updated>

<summary>On Valentine&apos;s Day, I found myself 500 miles away from my two daughters (10 and 7). I&apos;d already decided to get them a gift certificate from Amazon, with an e-greeting. Amazon has so much stuff, both kids could easily get...</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>


<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
On Valentine&apos;s Day, I found myself 500 miles away from my two daughters (10 and 7). I&apos;d already decided to get them a gift certificate from Amazon, with an e-greeting. Amazon has so much stuff, both kids could easily get...
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>Responsible Disclosure is Irresponsible</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2009/01/responsible-disclosure-is-irre.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2009://53.35095</id>

<published>2009-01-23T15:50:31Z</published>
<updated>2009-01-23T15:50:31Z</updated>

<summary>I was pretty amused recently when two people I respect went at each other over vulnerability disclosure, quickly devolving into name-calling. It&apos;s always fun to watch a flame war (nobody got compared to Hitler, but one person did get compared...</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />

<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
I was pretty amused recently when two people I respect went at each other over vulnerability disclosure, quickly devolving into name-calling. It&apos;s always fun to watch a flame war (nobody got compared to Hitler, but one person did get compared...
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>The Cult of Schneier</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2009/01/the-cult-of-schneier.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2009://53.34949</id>

<published>2009-01-12T19:00:00Z</published>
<updated>2009-01-12T19:00:00Z</updated>

<summary>Bruce Schneier has earned his reputation as IT Security&apos;s top pundit -- but I&apos;d like to make a plea for Schneierists to not accept every word he has written as utterly factual (even though he does totally rock).</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="cryptography" label="cryptography" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />

<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
Bruce Schneier has earned his reputation as IT Security&apos;s top pundit -- but I&apos;d like to make a plea for Schneierists to not accept every word he has written as utterly factual (even though he does totally rock).
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>New PKI problem: Resolved</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2009/01/new-pki-problem-resolved.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2009://53.34815</id>

<published>2009-01-01T15:08:32Z</published>
<updated>2009-01-01T15:08:32Z</updated>

<summary>The Internet is still broken, but no more broken than normal.  The risk level is acceptable for the average user, even though if a single user were being targeted, there&apos;s a good chance an attack would be successful.  This is how it&apos;s always been.  Let&apos;s go back to our lives.</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="internet" label="internet" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
<category term="ssl" label="ssl" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />

<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
The Internet is still broken, but no more broken than normal.  The risk level is acceptable for the average user, even though if a single user were being targeted, there&apos;s a good chance an attack would be successful.  This is how it&apos;s always been.  Let&apos;s go back to our lives.
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>The sky is not falling (re: today&apos;s PKI attack)</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2008/12/the-sky-is-not-falling-on-toda.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2008://53.34799</id>

<published>2008-12-30T16:26:08Z</published>
<updated>2008-12-30T16:26:08Z</updated>

<summary>In my last post I talked about how anybody with enough money (a small 6-figure sum) could create a rogue certification authority (CA). This would allow them to generate certificates for any web site that seem to be genuine. That...</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="securitypki" label="security pki" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />

<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
In my last post I talked about how anybody with enough money (a small 6-figure sum) could create a rogue certification authority (CA). This would allow them to generate certificates for any web site that seem to be genuine. That...
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>An attack on public key infrastructure</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2008/12/an-attack-on-public-key-infras.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2008://53.34795</id>

<published>2008-12-30T09:25:18Z</published>
<updated>2008-12-30T09:25:18Z</updated>

<summary>Any major changes to the way we establish trust are probably too big to actually happen.  That leaves the Internet fundamentally broken.</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="pki" label="pki" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
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<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
Any major changes to the way we establish trust are probably too big to actually happen.  That leaves the Internet fundamentally broken.
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>Virtualization: host security&apos;s silver bullet?</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2008/12/virtualization-host-securitys.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2008://53.34775</id>

<published>2008-12-26T19:47:56Z</published>
<updated>2008-12-26T19:47:56Z</updated>

<summary>The biggest problem with host-based security has always been what happens when your protection fails. And yes, all traditional host-based protections will have the potential for failure, especially when you consider that it&apos;s generally easy to trick users into installing...</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
<category term="virtualization" label="virtualization" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />

<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
The biggest problem with host-based security has always been what happens when your protection fails. And yes, all traditional host-based protections will have the potential for failure, especially when you consider that it&apos;s generally easy to trick users into installing...
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>Snake oil: legitimate vendors sell it too</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2008/12/snake-oil-legitimate-vendors-s.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2008://53.34702</id>

<published>2008-12-18T08:38:05Z</published>
<updated>2008-12-18T08:38:05Z</updated>

<summary>Traditionally when security experts talk about snake oil products, they are usually only brave enough to call out products from dubious companies that make claims that are obviously false... almost always around cryptography.  Few people call out venture-backed companies with well-known people on the management team.</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />

<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
Traditionally when security experts talk about snake oil products, they are usually only brave enough to call out products from dubious companies that make claims that are obviously false... almost always around cryptography.  Few people call out venture-backed companies with well-known people on the management team.
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>Why most companies shouldn&apos;t run intrusion prevention</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2008/12/why-most-companies-shouldnt-ru.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2008://53.34530</id>

<published>2008-12-04T17:44:58Z</published>
<updated>2008-12-04T17:44:58Z</updated>

<summary>One of the most pervasive security technologies that doesn&apos;t work very well is the intrusion detection/prevention system.  To get value out of an intrusion detection system, you need to be able to at least separate out some of the good alerts from the many irrelevant ones.</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="ids" label="ids" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
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<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />

<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
One of the most pervasive security technologies that doesn&apos;t work very well is the intrusion detection/prevention system.  To get value out of an intrusion detection system, you need to be able to at least separate out some of the good alerts from the many irrelevant ones.
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>Is Apple OS X More Secure than Windows?</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2008/12/is-apple-os-x-more-secure-than.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2008://53.34481</id>

<published>2008-12-01T12:05:48Z</published>
<updated>2008-12-01T12:05:48Z</updated>

<summary>I&apos;ve been operating almost exclusively on a Mac since OS X came out.  I grew up in Unix, and never liked the lack of usability in Windows, so it was a good fit.  However, I don&apos;t have any particular interest in making Apple look better than it really is, particularly when it comes to security.</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="osx" label="os x" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
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I&apos;ve been operating almost exclusively on a Mac since OS X came out.  I grew up in Unix, and never liked the lack of usability in Windows, so it was a good fit.  However, I don&apos;t have any particular interest in making Apple look better than it really is, particularly when it comes to security.
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>Our first big infection</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2008/11/our-first-big-infection.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2008://53.34277</id>

<published>2008-11-24T16:19:14Z</published>
<updated>2008-11-24T16:19:14Z</updated>

<summary>At 7:30 eastern this morning, one of my brothers called to tell me that he is, &quot;being attacked by hackers.&quot;  He was about to fall prey to a common scam.  He did have some bad stuff on his computer (his existing anti-virus had indeed failed him), but it was trying to get him to pay to remove itself and a bunch of phantom viruses that didn&apos;t really exist.</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="malware" label="malware" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />

<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
At 7:30 eastern this morning, one of my brothers called to tell me that he is, &quot;being attacked by hackers.&quot;  He was about to fall prey to a common scam.  He did have some bad stuff on his computer (his existing anti-virus had indeed failed him), but it was trying to get him to pay to remove itself and a bunch of phantom viruses that didn&apos;t really exist.
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>Why Microsoft&apos;s free AV won&apos;t matter</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2008/11/why-microsofts-free-av-wont-ma.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2008://53.34236</id>

<published>2008-11-20T18:24:26Z</published>
<updated>2008-11-20T18:24:26Z</updated>

<summary>Earlier this week, Microsoft announced that they&apos;re going to stop selling their consumer security product OneCare, and instead they&apos;re going to give away for free an AV product based on the same technology. I&apos;ve had several people ask me questions...</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="antivirus" label="anti-virus" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
<category term="microsoft" label="microsoft" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />

<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
Earlier this week, Microsoft announced that they&apos;re going to stop selling their consumer security product OneCare, and instead they&apos;re going to give away for free an AV product based on the same technology. I&apos;ve had several people ask me questions...
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>Why geeks don&apos;t like to run AV</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2008/11/why-geeks-dont-run-av.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2008://53.34192</id>

<published>2008-11-19T18:27:11Z</published>
<updated>2008-11-19T18:27:11Z</updated>

<summary>When you look at the average, non-technical user, they probably should be running AV, because it is pretty unobtrusive, it does catch some things (even if it&apos;s not many), and they don&apos;t have the same sense of what the real risks are as I do.  But, many technical people are like me.  We&apos;re only going to use security technology if it&apos;s easy to use and works pretty well, unless forced to do so by our bosses.  That leaves many geeks more vulnerable than they expect.  But I know plenty of people who didn&apos;t install AV even after an infection, because they thought the price was too high... they&apos;d rather do a very occasional cleanup.</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />

<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
When you look at the average, non-technical user, they probably should be running AV, because it is pretty unobtrusive, it does catch some things (even if it&apos;s not many), and they don&apos;t have the same sense of what the real risks are as I do.  But, many technical people are like me.  We&apos;re only going to use security technology if it&apos;s easy to use and works pretty well, unless forced to do so by our bosses.  That leaves many geeks more vulnerable than they expect.  But I know plenty of people who didn&apos;t install AV even after an infection, because they thought the price was too high... they&apos;d rather do a very occasional cleanup.
</content>
</entry>

<entry>
<title>My journey into security</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2008/11/my-journey-into-security.html" />
<id>tag:broadcast.oreilly.com,2008://53.34161</id>

<published>2008-11-17T14:15:29Z</published>
<updated>2008-11-17T14:15:29Z</updated>

<summary>While I don&apos;t believe that there is a &quot;silver bullet&quot; for security, I do think that end users should be getting a lot more for their money, by getting a better experience (e.g., AV that doesn&apos;t slow down their computer) and better security (e.g., AV that is more than one step above &quot;worthless&quot;).</summary>
<author>
<name>John Viega</name>
<uri>http://www.stonewallsoftware.com/</uri>
</author>

<category term="security" label="security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />

<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/">
While I don&apos;t believe that there is a &quot;silver bullet&quot; for security, I do think that end users should be getting a lot more for their money, by getting a better experience (e.g., AV that doesn&apos;t slow down their computer) and better security (e.g., AV that is more than one step above &quot;worthless&quot;).
</content>
</entry>

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